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ABSTRACT
What are the optimal tariffs of the US? What tariffs would prevail in a worldwide trade war? How
costly would be a breakdown of international trade policy cooperation? And what is the scope for
future multilateral trade negotiations? I address these and other questions using a unified framework
which nests traditional, new trade, and political economy motives for protection. I find that US optimal
tariffs average 60 percent, world trade war tariffs average 58 percent, the welfare losses from a breakdown
of international trade policy cooperation average 3.5 percent, and the possible welfare gains from future
multi- lateral trade negotiations average 0.3 percent. Optimal tariffs are tariffs which maximize a political
economy augmented measure of real income.
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I propose a ￿ exible framework for the quantitative analysis of noncooperative and cooperative
trade policy. It is based on a multi-country multi-industry general equilibrium model of
international trade featuring inter-industry trade as in Ricardo (1817), intra-industry trade
as in Krugman (1980), and special interest politics as in Grossman and Helpman (1994). By
combining these elements, it takes a uni￿ed view of trade policy which nests traditional, new
trade, and political economy motives for protection. Speci￿cally, it features import tari⁄s
which serve to manipulate the terms-of-trade, shift pro￿ts away from other countries, and
channel pro￿ts towards politically in￿ uential industries.
I use this framework to provide a ￿rst comprehensive quantitative analysis of noncoopera-
tive and cooperative trade policy. To this end, I calibrate it to perfectly match industry-level
trade and tari⁄s of the main players in recent GATT/WTO negotiations. I begin with an
investigation of unilateral trade policy: What are the optimal tari⁄s of the US and how pow-
erful are the traditional, new trade, and political economy motives for protection?1 I then
turn to an examination of multilateral trade policy: What tari⁄s would prevail in a worldwide
trade war and how costly would be a breakdown of international trade policy cooperation?
What tari⁄s would result from e¢ cient trade negotiations and how much scope is there for
future mutually bene￿cial trade liberalization?
With respect to unilateral trade policy, I ￿nd that US optimal tari⁄s vary widely across
industries and trading partners and average 60 percent. They would increase real income in
the US by 2.4 percent and decrease real incomes elsewhere by 1.3 percent on average. In
the US, imports would fall by 37 percent and a reallocation of resources to more pro￿table
industries would increase pro￿ts by 5.0 percent. In other countries, imports would fall by 10
percent on average, and a reallocation of resources to less pro￿table industries would decrease
pro￿ts by 1.6 percent on average. Traditional terms-of-trade e⁄ects and new trade pro￿t
shifting e⁄ects are the key driving forces behind these results.
With respect to multilateral trade policy, I ￿nd that world trade war tari⁄s vary widely
across industries, countries, and trading partners and average 58 percent. This is roughly
1Optimal tari⁄s are tari⁄s which maximize a political economy augmented measure of real income given by
equation (3).
2in line with the noncooperative tari⁄s observed following the Smoot-Hawley Tari⁄ Act of
1930. They would substantially decrease real income in all countries with the average loss
amounting to 3.5 percent. They would also induce a sharp drop in imports in all countries
with the average decline equaling 58 percent. I also ￿nd that factual tari⁄s are close to e¢ cient
tari⁄s in the sense that a mutually bene￿cial move from factual tari⁄s to e¢ cient tari⁄s would
only increase real incomes by 0.3 percent on average.
I am unaware of any quantitative analysis of noncooperative and cooperative trade policy
which is comparable in terms of its scope. I believe that this is the ￿rst quantitative framework
which nests traditional, new trade, and political economy motives for protection. Likewise,
there is no precedent for estimating noncooperative and cooperative tari⁄s at the industry level
for the major players in recent GATT/WTO negotiations. The surprising lack of comparable
work is most likely rooted in long-binding methodological and computational constraints.
In particular, widely accepted calibration techniques of general equilibrium trade models
have only become available quite recently following the seminal work of Eaton and Kortum
(2002). Also, the calculation of disaggregated noncooperative and cooperative tari⁄s is very
demanding computationally and was simply not feasible without present-day algorithms and
computers.
The most immediate predecessors are Perroni and Whalley (2000), Broda et al (2008), and
Ossa (2011). Perroni and Whalley (2000) provide quantitative estimates of noncooperative
tari⁄s in a simple Armington model which features only traditional terms-of-trade e⁄ects.
Ossa (2011) provides such estimates in a simple Krugman (1980) model which features only
new trade production relocation e⁄ects. Both contributions allow trade policy to operate only
at the most aggregate level so that a single tari⁄ is assumed to apply against all imports from
any given country.2 Broda et al (2008) provide detailed statistical estimates of the inverse
export supply elasticities faced by a number of non-WTO member countries. The idea is to
test the traditional optimal tari⁄ formula which states that a country￿ s optimal tari⁄ is equal
to the inverse export supply elasticity it faces in equilibrium.3
2Neither contribution computes cooperative tari⁄s. The work of Perroni and Whalley (2000) is in the
computable general equilibrium tradition and extends an earlier contribution by Hamilton and Whalley (1983).
It predicts implausibly high noncooperative tari⁄s of up to 1000 percent. See also Markusen and Wigle (1989).
3This approach is not suitable for estimating the optimal tari⁄s of WTO member countries. This is because
such countries impose cooperative tari⁄s so that the factual inverse export supply elasticities they face are not
3The paper further relates to an extensive body of theoretical and quantitative work. The
individual motives for protection are taken from the theoretical trade policy literature includ-
ing Johnson (1953-54), Venables (1987), and Grossman and Helpman (1994).4 The analysis
of trade negotiations builds on a line of research synthesized by Bagwell and Staiger (2002).
My calibration technique is similar to the one used in recent quantitative work based on the
Eaton and Kortum (2002) model such as Caliendo and Parro (2011). However, my analysis
di⁄ers from this work in terms of question and framework. In particular, I go beyond an
investigation of exogenous trade policy changes by emphasizing noncooperative and coopera-
tive tari⁄s.5 Also, I take a uni￿ed view of trade policy by nesting traditional, new trade, and
political economy e⁄ects.
My application focuses on 7 regions and 26 manufacturing industries in the year 2005.
The regions are Brazil, China, the EU, India, Japan, the US, and a residual Rest of the World
and are chosen to comprise the main players in recent GATT/WTO negotiations. I need data
on trade ￿ ows and tari⁄s as well as estimates of two sets of structural parameters. I construct
the matrix of trade ￿ ows from United Nations trade data, NBER production data, and World
Bank production data. I take the matrix of tari⁄s from an extension of United Nations tari⁄
data. I use US estimates of the elasticities of substitution by Broda and Weinstein (2006) and
US estimates of the in￿ uence of lobbies from Goldberg and Maggi (1999) for my benchmark
calculations but also provide extensive sensitivity checks. A detailed discussion of the data
including the applied aggregation, extrapolation, and matching procedures can be found in
the appendix.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I lay out the basic
setup, characterize the equilibrium for given tari⁄s, demonstrate how to compute the general
equilibrium e⁄ects of tari⁄ changes, and discuss the welfare e⁄ects of tari⁄ changes. I then
informative of the counterfactual inverse export supply elasticities they would face if they imposed optimal
tari⁄s under all but the most restrictive assumptions.
4The analyzed pro￿t shifting e⁄ect is more closely related to the production relocation e⁄ect in Venables
(1987) than the classic pro￿t shifting e⁄ect in Brander and Spencer (1981). This is explained in more detail
in footnote 11. See Mrazova (2010) for a recent treatment of classic pro￿t shifting e⁄ects in the context of
GATT/WTO negotiations.
5Existing work typically focuses on quantifying the e⁄ects of exogenous tari⁄ changes. Caliendo and Parro
(2011), for example, analyze the e⁄ects of the North American Free Trade Agreement. One exception can be
found in the work of Alvarez and Lucas (2007) which includes a short discussion of optimal tari⁄s in small
open economies.
4turn to US optimal tari⁄s, world trade wars, and world trade talks.
2 Analysis
2.1 Basic setup
There are N countries indexed by i or j and S industries indexed by s. Consumers have
access to a continuum of di⁄erentiated varieties. Preferences over these varieties are given by















where xijs is the quantity of an industry s variety from country i consumed in country j, Mis
is the mass of industry s varieties produced in country i, ￿s > 1 is the elasticity of substitution
between industry s varieties, and ￿js is the fraction of country j income spent on industry s
varieties.
Each variety is uniquely associated with an individual ￿rm. Firms are homogeneous








where lis is the labor requirement of an industry s ￿rm in country i featuring iceberg trade
barriers ￿ijs and a productivity parameter ’is. Each ￿rm has monopoly power with respect
to its own variety and the number of ￿rms is given exogenously.6
Governments can impose import tari⁄s but do not have access to other policy instruments.7
I denote the ad valorem tari⁄imposed by country j against imports from country i in industry
6The model can also be solved and calibrated with free entry and ￿xed costs of production. I focus on a
version without free entry for two main reasons. First, because it features positive pro￿ts and therefore lends
itself more naturally to an analysis of political economy considerations. Second, because it rules out corner
solutions with zero production in some sectors so that it can be implemented using a much simpler algorithm.
See footnote 11 for a further discussion of the model with free entry.
7This restriction is motivated by the fact that import tari⁄s have always been by far the most important
trade policy instruments in practice. However, it would be easy to extend the framework to also include
export subsidies, import quotas, or voluntary export restraints. See Bagwell and Staiger (2009a, 2009b) for
a discussion of the importance of this restriction for the theory of trade agreements in a range of simple new
trade models.
5s by tijs and make frequent use of the shorthand ￿ijs ￿ tijs + 1 throughout. Government
preferences are given by the following objective functions:








Pj is the welfare of country j, Xj is total expenditure or income in country j, Pj
is the ideal price index in country j, ￿js ￿ 0 is the political economy weight of industry s in
country j, and ￿js are the pro￿ts of industry s in country j.8
Notice that governments simply maximize welfare if the political economy weights are
zero. The interpretation of the political economy weights is that one dollar of pro￿ts in
industry s of country j counts 1 + ￿js as much as one dollar of wage income or tari⁄ revenue
in the government￿ s objective function. This formulation of government preferences can be
viewed as a reduced form representation of the "protection for sale" theory of Grossman and
Helpman (1994). I compute the political economy weights based on US estimates of Goldberg
and Maggi (1999) using a procedure which I explain in detail in the appendix. In essence,
I divide industries into politically organized and politically unorganized ones and set their
political economy weights to ￿is = 0:017 and ￿is = 0, respectively.9
2.2 Equilibrium for given tari⁄s







where pis is the ex-factory price of an industry s variety from country i and Pjs is the ideal
price index of industry s varieties in country j. Also, pro￿t maximization requires that ￿rms
8As in most trade models, welfare is the same as real income if nominal income is de￿ ated by the ideal
price index. This is because the ideal price index is a unit expenditure function and utility only depends on
consumption. Nominal income consists of labor income, pro￿ts, and tari⁄ revenue.
9In order to clearly expose the novel features of my framework, I deliberately abstract from intermediate
goods or nontraded goods, which is in line with much of the theoretical trade policy literature. The idea is
that intermediate goods tend to magnify the e⁄ects of trade policy while nontraded goods tend to dampen the
e⁄ects of trade policy so that omitting both seems like a reasonable ￿rst pass.







where wi is the wage rate in country i.
The equilibrium for given tari⁄s can be characterized with four condensed equilibrium
conditions. The ￿rst condition follows from substituting equations (2), (4), and (5) into the
relationship de￿ning industry pro￿ts ￿is = Mis
￿P


















The second condition combines equations (2), (4), and (5) with the requirement for labor





s ￿is (￿s ￿ 1) (7)




















And the ￿nal condition combines equations (4) and (5) with the budget constraint equating
total expenditure to labor income, plus tari⁄ revenue, plus aggregate pro￿ts:

















Conditions (6) - (9) represent a system of 2N (S + 1) equations in the 2N (S + 1) un-
knowns wi, Xi, Pis, and ￿is which can be solved given a numeraire. An obvious problem,
however, is that this system depends on the set of unknown parameters fMis;￿ijs;’isg which
are all di¢ cult to estimate empirically.
72.3 General equilibrium e⁄ects of tari⁄ changes
I avoid this problem by computing the general equilibrium e⁄ects of counterfactual tari⁄
changes using a method inspired by Dekle at al (2007). In particular, conditions (6) - (9) can
be rewritten in changes as
X









s ￿isb ￿is (11)
b Pjs =
￿X


























where a "hat" denotes the ratio between the counterfactual and the factual value, ￿ijs ￿
Tijs /
P
n Tins, ￿ijs ￿ ￿ijsTijs /
P





















ijs ￿jsXj is the factual value of industry s trade ￿ owing from country
i to country j evaluated at world prices.
Equations (10) - (13) represent a system of 2N (S + 1) equations in the 2N (S + 1) un-
knowns b wi, b Xi, b Pis, b ￿is. Crucially, their coe¢ cients depend on ￿s and observables only so
that the full general equilibrium response to counterfactual tari⁄ changes can be computed
without further information on any of the remaining model parameters. Moreover, all re-
quired observables can be inferred directly from widely available trade and tari⁄ data since














j Tijs in this constant markup environment.
Notice that this procedure also ensures that the counterfactual e⁄ects of tari⁄ changes
are computed from a reference point which perfectly matches industry-level trade and tari⁄s.
Essentially, it imposes a restriction on the set of unknown parameters fMis;￿ijs;’isg such
that the predicted Tijs perfectly match the observed Tijs given the observed ￿ijs and the
estimated ￿s. It is important to emphasize that the restriction on fMis;￿ijs;’isg does not
deliver estimates of fMis;￿ijs;’isg given the high dimensionality of the parameter space. To
obtain estimates of fMis;￿ijs;’isg, one would have to reduce this dimensionality, for example,
8by imposing some structure on the matrix of iceberg trade barriers.10
One issue with equations (10) - (13) is that they are based on a static model which does
not allow for aggregate trade imbalances thereby violating the data. The standard way of
addressing this issue is to introduce aggregate trade imbalances as constant nominal transfers
into the budget constraints. However, this approach has two serious limitations which have
gone largely unnoticed by the literature. First, the assumption of constant aggregate trade
imbalances leads to extreme general equilibrium adjustments in response to high tari⁄s and
cannot be true in the limit as tari⁄s approach in￿nity. Second, the assumption of constant
nominal transfers implies that the choice of numeraire matters since real transfers then change
with nominal prices.
To circumvent these limitations, I ￿rst purge the original data from aggregate trade im-
balances using my model and then conduct all subsequent analyses using this purged dataset.
The ￿rst step is essentially a replication of the original Dekle et al (2007) exercise using my
setup. In particular, I introduce aggregate trade imbalances as nominal transfers into the
budget constraint and calculate the general equilibrium responses of setting those transfers
equal to zero which allows me to construct a matrix of trade ￿ ows featuring no aggregate
trade imbalances. I discuss this procedure and its advantages as well as the ￿rst-stage results
in more detail in the appendix.
As an illustration of the key general equilibrium e⁄ects of trade policy, the upper panel of
Table 1 summarizes the e⁄ects of a counterfactual 25 percentage point increase in the US tari⁄
on pharmaceuticals or cosmetics. Pharmaceutical products have a relatively low elasticity of
substitution of 1.98 while cosmetic products have a relatively high elasticity of substitution
of 13.49. The ￿rst column gives the predicted percentage change in the US wage relative to
the numeraire. As can be seen, the US wage is predicted to increase by 0.15 percent if the
tari⁄ increase occurs in pharmaceuticals and is predicted to increase by 0.08 percent if the
tari⁄ increase occurs in cosmetics.
The second column presents the predicted percentage change in the quantity of US output
in the protected industry and the third column the simple average of the predicted percentage
10I do not further pursue an estimation of fMis;￿ijs;’isg in this paper, since the model relates Tijs and
fMis;￿ijs;’isg with a standard gravity equation whose empirical success is widely known.
9changes in the quantity of US output in the other industries. Hence, US output is predicted
to increase by 3.77 percent in pharmaceuticals and decrease by an average 0.06 percent in
all other industries if the tari⁄ increase occurs in pharmaceuticals. Similarly, US output is
predicted to increase by 4.03 percent in cosmetics and decrease by an average 0.12 percent in
all other industries if the tari⁄ increase occurs in cosmetics.
Intuitively, a US import tari⁄ makes imported goods relatively more expensive in the US
market so that US consumers shift expenditure towards US goods. This then incentivizes US
￿rms in the protected industry to expand which bids up US wages and thereby forces US ￿rms
in other industries to contract. Even though it is not directly implied by Table 1, it should be
clear that mirroring adjustments occur in other countries. In particular, ￿rms in the industry
in which the US imposes import tari⁄s contract which depresses wages and allows ￿rms in
other industries to expand.
2.4 Welfare e⁄ects of tari⁄ changes
Given the general equilibrium e⁄ects of tari⁄ changes, the implied welfare e⁄ects can be




is the change in the aggregate price
index. This framework features both traditional as well as new trade welfare e⁄ects of trade
policy. This can be seen most clearly from a log-linear approximation around factuals. As I
explain in detail in the appendix, it yields the following relationship for the welfare change
induced by tari⁄ changes, where
￿Vj













































The ￿rst term is a traditional terms-of-trade e⁄ect which captures changes in country
j￿ s real income due to di⁄erential changes in the world prices of country j￿ s production and
consumption bundles. Country j bene￿ts from an increase in the world prices of its produc-
tion bundle relative to the world prices of its consumption bundle because its exports then
command more imports in world markets. The terms-of-trade e⁄ect can also be viewed as a
relative wage e⁄ect since world prices are proportional to wages given the constant markup
10pricing captured by formula (5).
The second term is a new trade pro￿t shifting e⁄ect which captures changes in country
j￿ s real income due to changes in country j￿ s aggregate pro￿ts originating from changes in
industry output. It takes changes in industry pro￿ts, nets out changes in industry prices,
and then aggregates the remaining changes over all industries using pro￿t shares as weights.
These remaining changes are changes in industry pro￿ts originating from changes in indus-
try output since industry pro￿ts are proportional to industry sales in this constant markup
environment.11
The last term is a combined trade volume e⁄ect which captures changes in country j￿ s
real income due to changes in country j￿ s tari⁄ revenue originating from changes in import
volumes. It takes changes in import values, nets out changes in import prices, and then
aggregates the remaining changes over all countries and industries using tari⁄ revenue shares
as weights. These remaining changes are changes in import volumes since changes in import
values can be decomposed into changes in import prices and import volumes.12
As an illustration, the lower panel of Table 1 reports the welfare e⁄ects of the counter-
factual 25 percentage point increase in the US tari⁄ on pharmaceuticals or cosmetics and
decomposes them into terms-of-trade and pro￿t shifting components following equation (14).
As can be seen, US welfare increases by 0.08 percent if the tari⁄increase occurs in pharmaceu-
ticals but decreases by 0.01 percent if the tari⁄ increase occurs in cosmetics. The di⁄erential
welfare e⁄ects are due to di⁄erential pro￿t shifting e⁄ects. While the terms-of-trade e⁄ect
is positive in both cases, the pro￿t shifting e⁄ect is positive if the tari⁄ increase occurs in
11This pro￿t shifting e⁄ect is more closely related to the production relocation e⁄ect from Venables (1987)
than the classic pro￿t shifting e⁄ect from Brander and Spencer (1981). It can be shown that in a version






































, where the second term
can now be interpreted as a production relocation e⁄ect. Essentially, tari⁄s lead to changes in industry output
at the intensive margin without free entry and at the extensive margin with free entry.
12Readers familiar with the analysis of Flam and Helpman (1987) may wonder why decomposition (14) does
not reveal that tari⁄s can also be used to partially correct for a domestic distortion brought about by cross-
industry di⁄erences in markups. The reason is simply that this decomposition only captures ￿rst-order e⁄ects,
while the Flam and Helpman (1987) corrections operate through second-order adjustments in expenditure
shares. As will become clear in the discussion of e¢ cient tari⁄s, they always push governments to impose
somewhat higher tari⁄s on higher elasticity goods in an attempt to counteract distortions in relative prices.
While I take this force into account in all my calculations, I only emphasize it in the discussion of e¢ cient
tari⁄s, as the key channels through which countries can gain at the expense of one another are terms-of-trade
and pro￿t shifting e⁄ects.
11pharmaceuticals and negative if the pro￿t increase occurs in cosmetics.
The positive terms-of-trade e⁄ects are a direct consequence of the increase in the US
relative wage identi￿ed above. The di⁄erential pro￿t shifting e⁄ects are the result of cross-
industry di⁄erences in markups which are brought about by cross-industry di⁄erences in the
elasticity of substitution. Since the quantity of US output always increases in the protected
industry but decreases in other industries, the change in pro￿ts which is due to changes in
industry output is always positive in the protected industry but negative in other industries.
The overall pro￿t shifting e⁄ect depends on the net e⁄ect which is positive if the tari⁄increase
occurs in a high pro￿tability industry such as pharmaceuticals and negative if it occurs in a
low pro￿tability industry such as cosmetics.13
Notice that the overall welfare e⁄ects are smaller than the sum of the terms-of-trade and
pro￿t shifting e⁄ects in both examples. One missing factor is, of course, the trade volume
e⁄ect from equation (14). However, this e⁄ect is approximately zero in both examples since
the loss in tari⁄ revenue due to a decrease in import volumes in the protected industry is
approximately o⁄set by the gain in tari⁄ revenue due to an increase in import volumes in
other industries.14 The discrepancy therefore largely re￿ ects the fact that equation (14) only
provides a rough approximation if tari⁄ changes are as large as 25 percentage points since it
is obtained from a linearization around factuals.15
2.5 US optimal tari⁄s
The above discussion suggests that governments have incentives to use import tari⁄s to in-
crease relative wages generating a positive terms-of-trade e⁄ect and induce entry into high-
pro￿tability industries generating a positive pro￿t shifting e⁄ect. However, these incentives
combine with political economy considerations as governments also seek to protect high ￿is
industries to channel pro￿ts to politically in￿ uential special interest groups. I compute opti-











= 0 if ￿s = ￿ for all s so
that there is then no pro￿t shifting e⁄ect.
14The volume of overall US imports falls as a consequence of the higher tari⁄s in pharmaceuticals and
cosmetics. The reason that tari⁄ revenue still remains largely unchanged is that US tari⁄s on pharmaceuticals
and cosmetics are relatively small compared to US tari⁄s in other industries.
15In particular, the overall reduction in imports associated with the increase in tari⁄s also reduces the import
shares which leverage the improvement in relative world prices. This e⁄ect does not appear in equation (14)
since changes in import shares are second order e⁄ects.
12mal tari⁄s using the Su and Judd (forthcoming) method of mathematical programming with
equilibrium constraints, as I explain in detail in the appendix. Essentially, it involves maximiz-
ing the government￿ s objective function (3) subject to the equilibrium conditions (10) - (13),
which ensures relatively fast convergence despite the high dimensionality of the optimization
problem.
Figure 1a summarizes the optimal tari⁄s of the US taking as given all other countries￿
factual tari⁄s. It ranks all industries by elasticity of substitution and plots the optimal tari⁄
of the US with respect to all trading partners against the industry rank. As can be seen,
optimal tari⁄s vary widely across industries and are strongly decreasing in the elasticity of
substitution, as one would expect given the pro￿t shifting motive for protection. There is also
some variation across trading partners although it is much less pronounced. At 59 percent, the
average US optimal tari⁄ imposed against Brazil is the lowest. At 63 percent, the average US
optimal tari⁄ imposed against China is the highest. The average US optimal tari⁄ imposed
against all trading partners combined is 60 percent.
Figure 2a illustrates the changes in the value of US imports corresponding to US optimal
tari⁄s. It ranks all industries by elasticity of substitution and plots the predicted change in
US imports with respect to all trading partners against the industry rank. As a consequence
of the tilted tari⁄ schedule, US imports fall in most industries but increase sharply in the
highest elasticity industries. US relative wages rise faster than US tari⁄s in the highest
elasticity industries so that importing e⁄ectively becomes more attractive in these industries.
There is again relatively little variation across trading partners. At -44 percent, US imports
from Japan fall the most. At -33 percent, US imports from China fall the least. Overall, US
imports fall by 37 percent.16
Figure 3a highlights the changes in the quantity of US production corresponding to US
optimal tari⁄s. It ranks all industries by elasticity of substitution and plots the predicted
change in US shipments with respect to all trading partners against the industry rank. It also
includes changes in US domestic shipments and changes in US total shipments by industry. US
shipments to trading partners fall across the board mirroring the decline in US imports. This












b Tijs, and so on.
13decline is particularly pronounced in high elasticity industries. US total shipments increase in
low elasticity industries but decrease in high elasticity industries, as one would expect given
the pro￿t shifting motive for protection. Overall, the reallocation of resources towards high
pro￿tability industries increases total US pro￿ts by 5.0 percent.17
The ￿rst column of Table 2a lists the welfare e⁄ects corresponding to US optimal tari⁄s.
As can be seen, US optimal tari⁄s are predicted to increase US real income by 2.4 percent and
decrease real incomes elsewhere by 1.3 percent on average. The US can gain at the expense
of other countries because the terms-of-trade and pro￿t shifting e⁄ects have a beggar-thy-
neighbor character, which can be seen immediately from the second and third column of
Table 2a. The variation in the welfare losses of other countries largely re￿ ects variation in
their trade openness. With import shares of 32 and 24 percent, China and the Rest of the
World are the most open economies in the sample which explains why they lose most. With
import shares of 11 and 12 percent, the EU and Japan are the least open economies in the
sample which explains why they lose least.
To provide more perspective on these results, I have also computed the optimal tari⁄s
of all other countries, following the same procedure I applied for the US. As one would
expect, optimal tari⁄s are positively related to country size even though the relationship is
not particularly strong. India￿ s optimal tari⁄s are the lowest and average 56 percent. The
Rest of the World￿ s optimal tari⁄s are the highest and average 63 percent. While all countries
can gain considerably by imposing optimal tari⁄s, the international externalities they impose
vary substantially with country size. With an average welfare loss of -0.04 percent, India￿ s
optimal tari⁄s cause the least harm. With an average welfare loss of -1.9 percent, the Rest of
the World￿ s optimal tari⁄s cause the most harm.18
Table 3a returns to the US optimal tari⁄s and illustrates their sensitivity to alternative
assumptions on the elasticities of substitution. The ￿rst row simply restates the key results
from the benchmark analysis, which is based on the estimates of Broda and Weinstein (2006),
17Shipments are de￿ned as Qijs =
Tijs
pis . Changes in shipments can be computed from b Qijs =
b Tijs
b wi .












18Speci￿cally, the average optimal tari⁄s, changes in own welfare, and average changes in others￿welfare are
57.4%, 1.6%, and -0.1% for Brazil, 55.7%, 3.1%, and -0.6% for China, 60.9%, 1.4%, and -1.6% for the EU,
56.0%, 1.4%, -0.0% for India, 59.0%, 1.3%, and -0.6% for Japan, and 63.2%, 2.8%, and -1.9% for the Rest of
the World. All results are rounded to the number of digits shown.
14as detailed in the appendix. The following rows then recalculate everything using proportion-
ately scaled versions of the Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimates, where the scaling is such
that the elasticities average to the value displayed in the ￿rst column. The speci￿c range is
chosen to correspond to the range of aggregate trade elasticities suggested by Simonovska and
Waugh (2011).19 As can be seen, the optimal tari⁄s are strongly decreasing in the average
elasticity. Intuitively, lower elasticities give the US more monopoly power in world markets
which it optimally exploits through higher tari⁄s.
Table 4a explores the sensitivity of the results to alternative assumptions on the political
economy weights. The ￿rst row again restates the key results from the benchmark analysis,
which is based on the political economy weights of Goldberg and Maggi (1999), as explained
in the appendix. It also adds some further detail to the earlier discussion by quoting separate
average optimal tari⁄s for politically organized and politically unorganized industries. The
following rows then recalculate everything for proportionately scaled versions of the Goldberg
and Maggi (1999) estimates, where the scaling is such that the political economy weights in
organized industries equal the value shown in the ￿rst column. To accommodate a wide range
of beliefs on the quantitative importance of special interest politics, I consider alternative
political economy weights going all the way up to 75 percent.20
As can be seen, an increase in the political economy weights is mainly re￿ ected in an
increase in the average tari⁄s imposed by organized relative to unorganized industries and
does not a⁄ect the aggregate outcomes very much. Intuitively, political economy forces mainly
govern the distribution of rents within the economy and therefore have little e⁄ect on the
economy as a whole. Notice that channelling pro￿ts to politically in￿ uential industries requires
channelling sales to politically in￿ uential industries which can be achieved either by increasing
tari⁄s in such industries or by decreasing tari⁄s in other industries. The latter approach has
the advantage of also lowering the aggregate price index and is therefore pursued by the
government since interest groups are assumed to care about real pro￿ts according to the
19The trade elasticities are the partial equilibrium elasticities of trade ￿ ows with respect to trade costs and
equal 1 ￿ ￿s here. Simonovska and Waugh (2011) obtain their results in the context of an Eaton and Kortum
(2002) model, which means that their results do not exactly apply here. However, it is now well-understood
that di⁄erent gravity models share similar aggregate behaviors so that I still use their numbers as rough bounds.
20Notice that there is only a minimal di⁄erence between the results with original and no political economy
e⁄ects. The reason that average optimal tari⁄s are still higher in organized industries even without any political
economy e⁄ects is that the elasticities tend to be lower in these industries.
15government objective function (3).
While the Broda and Weinstein (2006) elasticities are typically accepted as the industry
standard, the Goldberg and Maggi (1999) weights are sometimes viewed as implausibly small.
I have therefore also considered calibrating the weights to match a given cross-industry dis-
tribution of optimal tari⁄s, as seems generally possible in light of the results in Table 4a.
However, the di¢ culty is that most countries set tari⁄s in GATT/WTO negotiations so that
their factual tari⁄s are not informative of their optimal tari⁄s without strong assumptions on
the nature of the negotiation process.21 Moreover, the aggregate outcomes seem fairly robust
along the political economy dimension so that the main promise of such a calibration would
have been the novel estimates of the weights per se which are not really what I am after in
this paper.
2.6 World trade wars
The above discussion of US optimal tari⁄s assumes that other countries do not retaliate which
allows the US to bene￿t considerably at their expense. I now turn to an analysis of the Nash
equilibrium in which all countries retaliate optimally. The Nash tari⁄s are such that each
government chooses its tari⁄s to maximize its objective function (3) given the tari⁄s of all
other governments as well as conditions (10) - (13). They can be computed by iterating over
the algorithm used to compute optimal tari⁄s, as I discuss in detail in the appendix. I refer to
optimal tari⁄s without retaliation as optimal tari⁄s and optimal tari⁄s with retaliation as Nash
tari⁄s throughout. I have experimented with many di⁄erent starting values without ￿nding
any di⁄erences in the results which makes me believe that the identi￿ed Nash equilibrium is
unique.22
Figure 1b provides a summary of the world Nash tari⁄s. It ranks all industries by elasticity
of substitution and plots the average Nash tari⁄imposed by each country against the industry
rank. As can be seen, the average Nash tari⁄s are quite similar to US optimal tari⁄s. At
21Of course, one could follow Broda et al (2006) and restrict attention to non-WTO member countries.
However, these countries tend to be rather special politically so that identifying political economy weights
from them seems problematic. For instance, Russia and Iran are currently the biggest non-WTO member
countries.
22This is, of course, subject to the well-known quali￿cation that complete autarky is also always a Nash
equilibrium.
1655 percent, the average Nash tari⁄s imposed by China are the lowest. At 62 percent, the
average Nash tari⁄s imposed by the Rest of the World are the highest. The average across all
Nash tari⁄ is 58 percent which is remarkably close to the average tari⁄ of 50 percent typically
reported for the trade war following the Smoot-Hawley tari⁄ Act of 1930.23 This trade war is
the only full-￿ edged trade war in economic history and therefore the only benchmark available
to me. Of course, it can only serve as a rough reference point given the di⁄erences in the set
of players and the timing of the experiment.
In order to compare the e⁄ects of world Nash tari⁄s to the e⁄ects of US optimal tari⁄s,
I now again focus on the US and present the Nash equilibrium analogs to Figures 2a and
3a. Figure 2b is the Nash equilibrium analog to Figure 2a. It illustrates the changes in the
value of US imports corresponding to world Nash tari⁄s. It ranks all industries by elasticity of
substitution and plots the predicted change in US imports with respect to all trading partners
against the industry rank. As can be seen, the US import responses to world Nash tari⁄s
summarized in Figure 2b are largely a magni￿ed version of the US import responses to US
optimal tari⁄s summarized in Figure 2a. At -65 percent, US imports from the EU fall the
most. At -55 percent, US imports from Japan fall the least. Overall, US imports fall by 62
percent as a consequence of world Nash tari⁄s which is almost twice the response predicted
as a consequence of US optimal tari⁄s.
Figure 3b is the Nash equilibrium analog to Figure 3a. It highlights the changes in the
quantity of US production corresponding to world Nash tari⁄s. It ranks all industries by
elasticity of substitution and plots the predicted change in US shipments with respect to
all trading partners against the industry rank. It also includes the changes in US domestic
shipments as well as changes in US total shipments by industry. As can be seen, the response
of US shipments exhibits less cross-industry dispersion under world Nash tari⁄s than under
US optimal tari⁄s. Since this is particularly true with regards to US total shipments, the
US is less successful at reallocating resources towards high pro￿tability industries in the Nash
equilibrium. This re￿ ects the fact that all countries attempt to promote their high pro￿tability
23See, for example, Bagwell and Staiger (2002: 43). The average Nash tari⁄ imposed by the US is 58 percent
and therefore 2 percentage points lower than the average optimal tari⁄ imposed by the US. Intuitively, Nash
tari⁄s tend to be smaller than optimal tari⁄s because lower trade volumes mean that there is less scope for
bene￿tting from unilateral trade policy interventions.
17industries at the same time. Overall, the reallocation of resources towards high pro￿tability
industries increases total US pro￿ts by 0.5 percent under world Nash tari⁄s which is only one
tenth of the e⁄ect under US optimal tari⁄s.
Table 2b lists the welfare e⁄ects of world Nash tari⁄s. As can be seen, the US is no longer
able to gain at the expense of other countries and welfare falls across the board with the
average loss equaling -3.5 percent. Intuitively, each country now increases its import tari⁄s in
an attempt to induce favorable terms-of-trade, pro￿t shifting, and political economy e⁄ects.
The end result is a large drop in trade volumes which leaves all countries worse o⁄. Similar
to the variation in the welfare e⁄ects of US optimal tari⁄s, the variation in the welfare e⁄ects
of world Nash tari⁄s on China, the EU, Japan, the Rest of the World, and now also the US
is largely due to variation in their trade openness. In contrast, the large negative welfare
e⁄ects on Brazil and India are mainly explained by their highly protectionist factual trade
policies. With average tari⁄s of 27 percent and 12 percent, India and Brazil have by far the
most protectionist factual trade policies in the sample which means that they increase their
tari⁄s by less than other countries when moving to Nash tari⁄s.
Tables 3b and 4b illustrate the sensitivity of world Nash tari⁄s to alternative assumptions
on the elasticities of substitution and the political economy weights in exactly the same fashion
as explained earlier for Tables 3a and 4a. As can be seen, world Nash tari⁄s are strongly
decreasing in the elasticity of substitution just like US optimal tari⁄s. Also, an increase in
the political economy weights is again mainly re￿ ected in an increase in the average tari⁄s
imposed by organized relative to unorganized industries and does not a⁄ect the aggregate
outcomes very much. Table 4b thereby con￿rms an observation made in conjunction with
Table 4a: If the cross-industry distribution of noncooperative tari⁄s was observable, it seems
that the political economy weights could be chosen to get the model predictions close to that
distribution without changing the aggregate results very much.
2.7 World trade talks
The ine¢ ciency of the Nash equilibrium creates incentives for international trade policy co-
operation. I now turn to an analysis of such cooperation by characterizing the outcome of
e¢ cient multilateral trade negotiations. As will become clear shortly, there is an entire e¢ -
18ciency frontier so that I have to take a stance on the speci￿c bargaining protocol. I adopt
one in the spirit of symmetric Nash bargaining according to which all governments evenly
split all e¢ ciency gains. In particular, I begin by solving max b G1 s.t. b Gj = b G1 8 j starting
at Nash tari⁄s, thereby invoking the same threat point as most of the theoretical literature.
However, I then also consider the outcome of max b G1 s.t. b Gj = b G1 8 j starting at factual
tari⁄s to quantify the scope for future mutually bene￿cial trade liberalization. As before, I
defer a detailed discussion of the algorithm to the appendix.
Figure 1c provides a summary of the world cooperative tari⁄s resulting from trade ne-
gotiations starting at Nash tari⁄s. It ranks all industries by the elasticity of substitution
and plots the average cooperative tari⁄ imposed by each country against the industry rank.
As can be seen, world cooperative tari⁄s are negative in the lowest elasticity industries and
increase strongly with the elasticity of substitution. There is also substantial variation across
countries with China clearly standing out. The cross-industry variation in the cooperative
tari⁄s counteracts distortions in relative prices originating from cross-industry variation in
markups. The cross-country variation in the cooperative tari⁄s induces terms-of-trade ef-
fects which replicate international side payments and ensure that all e¢ ciency gains are split
equally as required by the bargaining protocol.
To better understand the cross-industry variation in cooperative tari⁄s, notice that the
equilibrium in this economy is e¢ cient as long as relative prices equal relative marginal costs.24
If markups are the same across industries, this is the case without policy intervention so
that free trade is then ￿rst-best. If markups di⁄er across industries, however, relative prices
are distorted without policy intervention but can be fully corrected by taxing imports and
domestic sales in the high elasticity industries and subsidizing imports and domestic sales
in the low elasticity industries. This is also what governments attempt in the cooperative
equilibrium with the important di⁄erence that they are given no access to domestic policy
instruments so that they have to approximate the ￿rst-best allocation with the help of only
trade policy instruments. This is similar to the point of Flam and Helpman (1987).
24To see this, consider the e⁄ects of a fully symmetric increase in markups starting at the e¢ cient benchmark
where prices equal marginal costs. On the demand side, consumption would be unchanged for all varieties since
relative prices would be unchanged and pro￿ts would be fully redistributed to consumers. On the supply side,
output would be unchanged for all varieties since there is a ￿xed number of ￿rms, a ￿xed supply of workers,
and wages adjust to ensure full employment.
19To better understand the cross-country variation in cooperative tari⁄s, notice that a combi-
nation of import tari⁄s and import subsidies can induce terms-of-trade e⁄ects which replicate
international side payments. As an illustration, consider the case of the US and China. If the
US imposes an across-the-board import tari⁄, this improves the US terms-of-trade but also
increases the prices of Chinese goods relative to US goods in the US market with the opposite
occurring in China. If China now responds with the right across-the board import subsidy, it
is possible to further improve the US terms-of-trade but now decrease the prices of Chinese
goods relative to US goods in the US market back to their original level with the opposite
occurring in China. In this situation, China would then e⁄ectively make a side payment to
the US. This is essentially the point of Mayer (1981).
The fact that China￿ s cooperative tari⁄s are so far below all other countries￿cooperative
tari⁄s therefore implies that China e⁄ectively makes large side payments as a result of e¢ cient
trade negotiations. The reason is simply that China is by far the most open economy in the
sample which means that it stands to gain most from a cooperative approach and therefore
needs to make large international transfers to ensure that all countries eventually gain the
same. Of course, the cross-country variation in cooperative tari⁄s also depends critically on
the speci￿c bargaining protocol. For example, an increase in China￿ s bargaining weight would
reduce the side payments required from China and would therefore change the cross-country
distribution of cooperative tari⁄s in China￿ s favor while leaving the cross-industry distribution
of cooperative tari⁄s unchanged.
In order to compare the e⁄ects of world cooperative tari⁄s to the e⁄ects of US optimal
tari⁄s and world Nash tari⁄s, I now again focus on the US and present the cooperative
equilibrium analogs to Figures 2a/b and 3a/b. An important di⁄erence, however, is that
Figures 2a/b and 3a/b depict all changes relative to factual tari⁄s whereas I now illustrate
everything relative to Nash tari⁄s. Figure 2c is the cooperative equilibrium analog to Figures
2a/b. It illustrates the changes in the value of US imports corresponding to world cooperative
tari⁄s. It ranks all industries by elasticity of substitution and plots the predicted change in
US imports with respect to all trading partners against the industry rank. As can be seen,
a move from world Nash tari⁄s to world cooperative tari⁄s leads to a substantial rise in US
imports which is particularly pronounced in low elasticity industries.
20Figure 3c is the cooperative equilibrium analog to Figures 3a/b. It ranks all industries
by elasticity of substitution and plots the predicted change in US shipments with respect to
all trading partners against the industry rank. It also includes changes in US domestic ship-
ments and changes in US total shipments by industry. US shipments to trading partners rise
across the board mirroring the increase in US imports. This rise is particularly pronounced
in low elasticity industries. Perhaps surprisingly, US total shipments do not rise much in low
elasticity industries compared to high elasticity industries even though this is part of what
governments attempt to achieve. The reason is that the lack of domestic policy instruments
limits the governments￿ability to fully correct the cross-industry distortions in relative prices.
While import tari⁄s can deal with the cross-industry distortion in relative prices among im-
ported goods, they cannot deal with the cross-industry distortion in relative prices among
domestic goods. Moreover, they themselves introduce cross-country distortions in relative
prices which governments seek to avoid.
The ￿rst column of Table 2c lists the welfare e⁄ects of moving from world Nash tari⁄s to
world cooperative tari⁄s. Since changes in government welfare are the same by construction
and the Goldberg and Maggi (1999) political economy weights are small, changes in repre-
sentative agent welfare are also almost the same. The relative wage changes correspond to
the terms-of-trade changes which replicate international transfers as discussed above. As can
be seen, China￿ s relative wages fall the most by far which implies that China has to make
the largest side payments by far. The fact that changes in industry output have increased
pro￿ts in almost all countries follows from the heavily tilted tari⁄ schedule which e⁄ectively
shifts consumer expenditure to high-pro￿tability industries. While much of the consumer
expenditure is taxed away in high-elasticity low-pro￿tability industries, large subsidies add
to consumer expenditure in the low-elasticity high-pro￿tability industries, thereby expanding
high-pro￿tability industries across the world.
To quantify the gap between factual tari⁄s and e¢ cient tari⁄s, I have performed two
additional calculations. First, I computed the welfare changes of moving from factual tari⁄s
to e¢ cient tari⁄s, where e¢ cient tari⁄s solve max b G1 s.t. b Gj = b G1 8 j starting at Nash
tari⁄s, just as above. At -3.4 percent and -1.5 percent, China and India would lose the most.
21At 1.4 percent and 1.0 percent, the EU and Japan would gain the most.25 This ￿nding lends
support to the common conjecture that developing countries have been favored in past trade
negotiations. Second, I computed the welfare changes of moving from factual tari⁄s to e¢ cient
tari⁄s, where e¢ cient tari⁄s now solve max b G1 s.t. b Gj = b G1 8 j starting at factual tari⁄s. I
￿nd that such mutually bene￿cial trade liberalization would only increase real incomes by 0.3
percent or 0.4 percent in each country, which implies that factual tari⁄s are relatively close to
e¢ cient tari⁄s in a welfare sense.26 The main reason is that factual tari⁄s are still high only
in emerging economies such as India and Brazil, which do not matter so much to the world
as a whole.27
Tables 3c and 4c illustrate the sensitivity of world cooperative tari⁄s to alternative as-
sumptions on the elasticities of substitution and the political economy weights in exactly the
same fashion as explained earlier for Tables 3a and 4a. Here, I return to the case where e¢ -
cient tari⁄s solve max b G1 s.t. b Gj = b G1 8 j starting at Nash tari⁄s and where all welfare e⁄ects
are computed relative to Nash tari⁄s as well. Table 3c reveals that the average world coop-
erative tari⁄ is closer to zero the higher is the elasticity of substitution which simply re￿ ects
the fact that mark-up distortions are less severe the smaller the degree of monopoly power.
Table 4c shows that the political economy weights matter somewhat more for the aggregate
results pertaining to world cooperative tari⁄s, than they did in the case of US optimal tari⁄s
or world Nash tari⁄s. The reason is that the cooperative way of increasing real pro￿ts in
politically organized industries, which is to cross-subsidize imports in these industries, entails
signi￿cant distortions.
25Speci￿cally, real income changes by 0.5% for Brazil, -3.4% for China, 1.4% for the EU, -1.5% for India,
1.0% for Japan, -0.7% for the Rest of the World, and 0.8% for the US. All results are rounded to the number
of digits shown.
26Speci￿cally, real income changes by 0.3% for Brazil, 0.3% for China, 0.4% for the EU, 0.3% for India, 0.4%
for Japan, 0.3% for the Rest of the World, and 0.3% for the US. All results are rounded to the number of
digits shown. The cross-industry distribution of e¢ cient tari⁄s looks virtually identical to the one displayed in
Figure 1c.
27Speci￿cally, the average factual tari⁄ is 12% for Brazil, 4% for China, 2% for the EU, 27% for India, 1%
for Japan, 6% for the Rest of the World, and 2% for the US. All results are rounded to the number of digits
shown.
223 Conclusion
I proposed a ￿ exible framework for the quantitative analysis of noncooperative and cooperative
trade policy which nests traditional, new trade, and political economy motives for protection.
I used this framework to address some natural questions emerging from the qualitative trade
policy literature. I began with an investigation of unilateral trade policy: What are the
optimal tari⁄s of the US and how powerful are the traditional, new trade, and political
economy motives for protection? I then turned to an examination of multilateral trade policy:
What tari⁄s would prevail in a worldwide trade war and how costly would be a breakdown
of international trade policy cooperation? What tari⁄s would result from e¢ cient trade
negotiations and how much scope is there for future mutually bene￿cial trade liberalization?
The interpretation of my results depends on whether the framework is taken as a main-
tained or tested hypothesis. In the former case, they can be viewed as answers to questions of
immediate policy relevance: for example, as revealing what would have happened if a trade
war had broken out in the wake of the recent ￿nancial crisis; or as suggesting how much
there is to gain from future multilateral trade negotiations. In the latter case, they can be
interpreted as suggestive of the plausibility of some of the leading models of trade policy
making: for example, as demonstrating that the predicted tari⁄s are roughly in line with the
noncooperative tari⁄s observed following the Smoot-Hawley Tari⁄ Act of 1930; or as showing
that the underlying trade policy externalities can be su¢ ciently strong to plausibly justify a
lengthy process of multilateral trade negotiations.
Given the near-absence of prior quantitative analyses of noncooperative and cooperative
trade policy, the framework could be extended in many ways and used to address a whole host
of related questions emerging from the large qualitative trade policy literature. As one of many
examples, one could restrict multilateral trade negotiations to abide by the GATT/WTO
principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination as formalized by Bagwell and Staiger (1999)
and ask whether they are helpful or harmful for achieving and maintaining global e¢ ciency.
This could entail a quantitative analysis of the long-standing debate associated with Bhagwati
(1991) of whether free trade agreements, which are allowed under GATT/WTO rules as
an important exception to the principle of nondiscrimination, represent building-blocks or
23stumbling-blocks on the way towards full multilateral cooperation.
244 Appendix
4.1 Data
The data on international trade ￿ ows is from the UN-Comtrade database which covers most
countries in the world. It is originally at the HS 6-digit level and I convert it to the SITC-
Rev2 4-digit level using an NBER concordance which I downloaded from Jon Haveman￿ s
website at Maclester College. I then aggregate it to the 2-digit level by summing over all
relevant industries. I impute domestic trade ￿ ows using US shipment data from the NBER-
CES manufacturing industry database which is originally at the SIC 4-digit level as well as
worldwide value added data from the World Bank-WDI database which is at the country
level. The NBER-CES manufacturing data is only available until the year 2005 which is why
I choose this year for my analysis. I use the following procedure to impute domestic trade
￿ ows:
First, I convert the US shipment data to the SITC-Rev2 4-digit level using a concordance
between SIC 4-digit codes and SITC-Rev2 4-digit codes constructed by matching concordances
from Feenstra (1996) and Pierce and Schott (2010). Second, I merge the US shipment data
with the US trade data and compute the US industry expenditure shares which I subsequently
apply to all other countries. Third, I compute total expenditures for all countries from total
shipments, minus total exports, plus total imports. I impute total shipments for all countries
other than the US by dividing value added by 0.312 which is the number for value added
reported by Dekle et al (2007). Fourth, I compute domestic trade ￿ ows for all countries other
than the US by multiplying the expenditure shares with total expenditures and subtracting
industry imports. Finally, I aggregate the domestic trade ￿ ows to the 2-digit level by summing
over all relevant industries.
The tari⁄ data was generously provided to me by John Romalis. It is a carefully cleaned
version of the TRAINS-UN data which gives applied tari⁄s in ad valorem terms. Applied
tari⁄s are either the most-favored nation tari⁄s or preferential tari⁄s if exceptions such as free
trade agreements apply. It is originally at the SITC-Rev2 4-digit level and I aggregate it to
the 2-digit level by averaging over all relevant tari⁄s using trade weights.
The elasticities are taken from Broda and Weinstein (2006). I use the SITC-Rev3 3-digit
25level elasticities computed for the period 1990-2001 for the US. I aggregate these elasticities
to the 2-digit level by averaging over all relevant industries. The SITC-Rev2 and SITC-
Rev3 codes are very similar at the 2-digit level. Since elasticities tend to decrease with the
level of aggregation, this procedure is likely to generate elasticities which are somewhat too
high. I have therefore also experimented with the elasticity estimation technique suggested
by Caliendo and Parro (2011). However, my tari⁄ data does not contain enough variation for
this technique to deliver signi￿cant results.
The political economy weights are constructed based on the estimates of Goldberg and
Maggi (1999) for the US. Their Table B1 provides a list of unorganized industries at the SIC 3-
digit level which I aggregate to the SITC-Rev2 2-digit level using the same concordance I used
for the US shipment data. I then rank the SITC-Rev2 2-digit level industries by how many
unorganized SIC 3-digit level industries they contain and impose the share of unorganized
industries from Table B1. I ￿nally set ￿is =
￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
=￿ ￿ in all organized industries and ￿is = 0
in all unorganized industries, where ￿ ￿ = 0:9837 is the average "implied ￿" from their Table
1. I apply the same political economy weights in all countries.
I focus on 7 regions and 26 manufacturing industries. The 7 regions are Brazil, China, the
EU, India, Japan, the US, and a residual Rest of the World and are chosen to comprise the
main players in recent GATT/WTO negotiations. The 26 manufacturing industries are all
SITC-Rev2 2-digit manufacturing industries other than those from section 8 ("Miscellaneous
manufactured articles"). I drop the manufacturing industries from section 8 only to somewhat
contain the computational intensity of the analysis. The average tari⁄across all countries and
industries included in the sample is 7.6 percent and the median is given by 3.9 percent. The
average elasticity of substitution across all industries included in the sample is 3.9 percent
and the median is given by 2.5 percent.
4.2 Elimination of aggregate trade imbalances
To purge the trade data of aggregate trade imbalances, I essentially replicate the original Dekle
et al (2007) exercise using my model. In particular, I introduce aggregate trade imbalances as
































s (Tijs ￿ Tjis) is taken from the data. I then use equations (10), (11),
(12), and (15) to solve for the general equilibrium e⁄ects b wi; b Xi; b Pis;b ￿is resulting from setting
d NXj = 0 while keeping all tari⁄s unchanged. I ￿nally use these general equilibrium e⁄ects to






delivers a trade matrix without aggregate trade imbalances.
Aggregate trade imbalances are quite large in the raw data. In particular, exports minus
imports as a ratio of exports plus imports equal 10 percent for Brazil, 12 percent for China, 8
percent for the EU, -17 percent for India, 46 percent for Japan, -11 percent for the Rest of the
World, and -20 percent for the US. The predicted changes in exports and imports resulting
from an elimination of aggregate trade imbalances are -12 percent and 7 percent for Brazil,
-9 percent and 15 percent for China, -9 percent and 7 percent for the EU, 13 percent and -21
percent for India, -28 percent and 94 percent for Japan, 9 percent and -14 percent for the
Rest of the World, and 17 percent and -23 percent for the US.
As indicated in the main text, calculating the counterfactual e⁄ects of trade policy changes
using the purged data and equations (10), (11), (12), and (13) has two main advantages over
the standard approach which would call for using the raw data and equations (10), (11),
(12), and (15) with aggregate net exports kept unchanged. First, the assumption of constant
aggregate trade imbalances leads to extreme general equilibrium adjustments in response to
high tari⁄s and cannot be true in the limit as tari⁄s approach in￿nity. Second, the assumption
of constant nominal transfers implies that the choice of numeraire matters since real transfers
then change with nominal prices.
While the ￿rst point should be obvious, the second point may not be immediately clear.
To see the problem, notice that country j￿ s real income depends on
NXj
Pj in the presence
of aggregate trade imbalances if they are introduced as nominal transfers into the budget
constraints. If NXj is held ￿xed, changes in real income therefore depend on changes in Pj
which, in turn, depend on the choice of numeraire. As a result, changes in all real variables
27then depend on the choice of numeraire which can be a serious problem. Notice that NXj
can generally not be held ￿xed in real terms since it also has to satisfy the global adding up
constraint
P
j NXj = 0. Notice also that the numeraire is not an issue in the original Dekle
et al (2008) exercise since aggregate net exports are then set equal to zero anyway.
4.3 Algorithm
As indicated in the main text, calculating disaggregated noncooperative and cooperative tari⁄s
is very intensive computationally due to the high dimensionality of the problem which has been
a major barrier to progress in the area. I overcome this barrier with a combination of modern
computing power and an e¢ cient algorithm based on the idea of mathematical programming
with equilibrium constraints as formulated in Su and Judd (forthcoming). Using a high-end
desktop computer and standard MATLAB software, it takes about 3 days to calculate all
results which are reported in the paper.
I compute US optimal tari⁄s by maximizing the government￿ s objective function (3) sub-
ject to the equilibrium conditions (10) - (13) using the algorithm suggested by Su and Judd
(forthcoming). To minimize the dimensionality of the problem, I do not literally use equations
(10) - (13) but substitute ￿rst for b ￿is using equation (10) and then for b Pjs using equation (12).
As an alternative, I have also experimented with computing optimal tari⁄s directly from the
￿rst-order conditions which can also be manipulated in the spirit of Dekle et al (2008). How-
ever, I eventually abandoned this approach since it did not su¢ ciently improve performance
to justify the substantial added complication.
I compute world Nash tari⁄s using a similar approach as Perroni and Whalley (2000) and
Ossa (2011). Starting at factual tari⁄s, I let one country impose its optimal tari⁄s, then let
the next country impose its optimal tari⁄s given the ￿rst country￿ s optimal tari⁄s, and so on,
until the solution converges in the sense that no country has an incentive to deviate from its
tari⁄s. I have experimented with many di⁄erent starting values without ￿nding any di⁄erences
in the result which makes me believe that the identi￿ed Nash equilibrium in unique. This is,
of course, subject to the well-known quali￿cation that complete autarky is also always a Nash
equilibrium.
I compute world cooperative tari⁄s by maximizing b G1 subject to the equilibrium conditions
28(10) - (13) as well as the condition that b Gj = b G1 for all j using again the algorithm suggested
by Su and Judd (forthcoming). I either start from Nash tari⁄s or factual tari⁄s and again
substitute ￿rst for b ￿is using equation (10) and then for b Pjs using equation (12) to reduce the
dimensionality of the problem. As discussed in the main text, there is an entire frontier of
e¢ cient tari⁄s due to the existence of de facto side payments and restricting b Gj = b G1 for all
j can be thought of as ￿nding the point on that frontier which also lies on a 45 degree line
from the origin.
4.4 Derivations
4.4.1 Derivation of equation (14)




























































































































Pj . Notice that changes in
pro￿ts which are due to changes in prices are attributed to the terms-of-trade e⁄ect. Notice
also that changes in the price index which directly result from changes in tari⁄s cancel with
changes in tari⁄ revenue which directly result from changes in tari⁄s.
29References
[1] Alvarez, F. and R. Lucas. 2007. "General Equilibrium Analysis of the Eaton-Kortum
Model of International Trade." Journal of Monetary Economics 54(6): 1726-1768.
[2] Bhagwati, J. 1991. "The World Trading System at Risk." Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
[3] Bagwell, K. and R. Staiger. 1999. "An Economic Theory of GATT." American Economic
Review 89(1): 215-248.
[4] Bagwell, K. and R. Staiger. 2006. The Economics of the World Trading System. Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press.
[5] Bagwell, K. and R. Staiger. 2009a. "Delocation and Trade Agreements in Imperfectly
Competitive Markets." Manuscript, Stanford University.
[6] Bagwell, K. and R. Staiger. 2009b. "Pro￿t Shifting and Trade Agreements in Imperfectly
Competitive Markets." Manuscript, Stanford University.
[7] Bagwell and Staiger. 2011. "What Do Trade Negotiators Negotiate About? Empirical
Evidence from the World Trade Organization." American Economic Review 101(4): 1238-
1273.
[8] Brander, J. and B. Spencer. 1981. "Tari⁄s and the Extraction of Foreign Monopoly Rents
under Potential Entry." Canadian Journal of Economics 14: 371-389.
[9] Broda, C., N. Limao, and D. Weinstein. 2008. "Optimal Tari⁄s and Market Power: The
Evidence." American Economic Review 98(5): 2032-2065.
[10] Broda, C. and D. Weinstein. 2006. "Globalization and the Gains from Variety." Quarterly
Journal of Economics 121(2): 541-585.
[11] Caliendo, L. and F. Parro. 2011. "Estimates of the Trade and Welfare E⁄ects of NAFTA."
Manuscript, University of Chicago.
[12] Dekle, R., J. Eaton, and S. Kortum. 2007. "Unbalanced Trade." American Economic
Review Papers and Proceedings 97(2): 351-355.
30[13] Eaton, J. and S. Kortum. 2002. "Technology, Geography, and Trade." Econometrica
70(5): 1741-1779.
[14] Feenstra, R. 1996. "US Imports, 1972-1994: Data and Concordances." NBER Working
Paper 5515
[15] Flam, H., Helpman, E. 1987. "Industrial Policy under Monopolistic Competition." Jour-
nal of International Economics 22: 79-102.
[16] Goldberg, P. and G. Maggi. 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation."
American Economic Review 89(5): 1135-1155.
[17] Grossman, G. and E. Helpman. 1994. "Protection for Sale." American Economic Review
84(4): 833-850.
[18] Hamilton, B. and J. Whalley. 1983. "Optimal Tari⁄ Calculations in Alternative Trade
Models and Some Possible Implications for Current World Trading Arrangements." Jour-
nal of International Economics 15: 323-348.
[19] Johnson, H. 1953-54. "Optimum Tari⁄s and Retaliation." Review of Economic Studies
21(2): 142-153.
[20] Markusen, J. and R. Wigle. 1989. "Nash Equilibrium Tari⁄s for the United States and
Canada: The Roles of Country Size, Scale Economies, and Capital Mobility." Journal of
Political Economy 97(2): 368-386.
[21] Mayer, W. 1981. "Theoretical Considerations on Negotiated Tari⁄Adjustments." Oxford
Economic Papers 33: 135-153.
[22] Mrazova, M. 2011. "Trade Agreements When Pro￿ts Matter." Manuscript, London
School of Economics.
[23] Krugman, P. 1980. "Scale Economies, Product Di⁄erentiation, and the Pattern of Trade."
American Economic Review 70(5): 950-959.
[24] Ossa, R. 2011. "A "New Trade" Theory of GATT/WTO Negotiations." Journal of Po-
litical Economy 119(1): 122-152.
31[25] Perroni, C. and J. Whalley. 2000. "The New Regionalism: Trade Liberalization or Insur-
ance?" Canadian Journal of Economics 33(1): 1-24.
[26] Pierce, J. and P. Schott. 2009. "Concording US Harmonized System Codes Over Time."
NBER Working Paper 15548.
[27] Ricardo, D. 1817. "On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation." London,
United Kingdom: John Murray.
[28] Simonovska, I. and M. Waugh. 2011. The Elasticity of Trade: Estimates and Evidence.
Manuscript, New York University.
[29] Su, C. and K. Judd. Forthcoming. "Constrained Optimization Approaches to Estimation
of Structural Models." Econometrica.
[30] Venables, A. 1987. "Trade and Trade Policy with Di⁄erentiated Products: A
Chamberlinian-Ricardian Model." Economic Journal 97: 700-717.
32TABLE 1: E⁄ects of 25 percentage point increase in US tari⁄
General equilibrium e⁄ects
￿ US wage ￿ US production (protected) ￿ US production (other)
Pharm. 0.15% 3.77% -0.06%
Cosm. 0.08% 4.03% -0.12%
Welfare e⁄ects
￿ US welfare Terms-of-trade e⁄ect Pro￿t shifting e⁄ect
Pharm. 0.08% 0.03% 0.07%
Cosm. -0.01% 0.02% -0.02%
Notes: The entries under "General equilibrium e⁄ects" are the percentage change in the US wage relative
to the numeraire (column 1), the percentage change in the quantity of output in the US pharmaceutical or
cosmetics industry (column 2), and the average of the percentage changes in the quantity of output in the
other US industries (column 3). The entries under "Welfare e⁄ects" are the percentage change in US welfare
(column 1), the component due to terms-of-trade e⁄ects (column 2), and the component due to pro￿t shifting
e⁄ects (column 3). The values in column 2 and 3 do not add up to the value in column 1 because they are
computed using equation (14) which is a linear approximation. Here, all changes are computed relative to
factual tari⁄s.
33TABLE 2a: E⁄ects of US optimal tari⁄s
￿ welfare ￿ wage ￿ pro￿ts ￿ imports
Brazil -1.0% -2.4% -1.0% -10.3%
China -1.8% -2.7% -3.2% -7.6%
European Union -0.8% -2.5% -1.1% -12.2%
India -1.0% -2.8% -1.1% -7.8%
Japan -0.7% -2.9% -0.8% -11.1%
Rest of World -2.4% -2.6% -2.6% -13.2%
United States 2.4% 15.9% 5.0% -36.9%
TABLE 2b: E⁄ects of world Nash tari⁄s
￿ welfare ￿ wage ￿ pro￿ts ￿ imports
Brazil -2.8% -2.7% 0.6% -58.6%
China -6.5% -1.3% -4.1% -58.2%
European Union -2.0% 3.8% -1.7% -63.2%
India -4.7% -7.1% -0.9% -45.8%
Japan -2.3% 4.1% -2.9% -60.3%
Rest of World -3.9% 1.3% 0.1% -60.8%
United States -2.5% 1.9% 0.5% -62.0%
TABLE 2c: E⁄ects of world cooperative tari⁄s
￿ welfare ￿ wage ￿ pro￿ts ￿ imports
Brazil 3.4% 5.2% 0.5% 223.2%
China 3.3% -10.2% 11.3% 165.2%
European Union 3.4% 4.3% 2.7% 223.7%
India 3.4% 2.8% -1.4% 168.8%
Japan 3.4% -0.3% 4.1% 190.4%
Rest of World 3.4% -2.8% 2.1% 198.2%
United States 3.4% 1.0% 0.9% 201.5%
Notes: The entries are the percentage change in real income (column 1), the percentage change in the nominal
wage normalized such that the average change is equal to zero (column 2), the percentage change in total pro￿ts
due to changes in industry output (column 3), and the percentage change in the value of imports (column 4).
All changes are computed relative to factual tari⁄s in Table 2a and Table 2b but relative to Nash tari⁄s in
Table 2c.
34TABLE 3a: Sensitivity of US optimal tari⁄s w.r.t ￿s
Original Broda and Weinstein (2006) elasticities
average ￿s average US tari⁄ ￿ US welfare
3.9 60.0% 2.4%
Proportionately scaled Broda and Weinstein (2006) elasticities





TABLE 3b: Sensitivity of world Nash tari⁄s w.r.t ￿s
Original Broda and Weinstein (2006) elasticities
average ￿s average tari⁄ ￿ average welfare
3.9 57.9% -3.5%
Proportionately scaled Broda and Weinstein (2006) elasticities





TABLE 3c: Sensitivity of world cooperative tari⁄s w.r.t ￿s
Original Broda and Weinstein (2006) elasticities
average ￿s average tari⁄ ￿ average welfare
3.9 -4.9% 3.4%
Proportionately scaled Broda and Weinstein (2006) elasticities





Notes: The entries are the average elasticity of substitution (column 1), the average US optimal tari⁄, world
Nash tari⁄, or world cooperative tari⁄ (column 2), and the percentage change in US real income resulting from
US optimal tari⁄s, average percentage change in world real income resulting from world Nash tari⁄s, or average
percentage change in world real income resulting from world cooperative tari⁄s (column 3). All changes are
computed relative to factual tari⁄s in Table 3a and Table 3b but relative to Nash tari⁄s in Table 3c.
35TABLE 4a: Sensitivity of US optimal tari⁄s w.r.t ￿is
Original Goldberg and Maggi (1999) political weights
￿is average US tari⁄ ￿ US welfare
organized all organized other
0.0166 60.0% 65.7% 50.8% 2.4%
Proportionately scaled Goldberg and Maggi (1999) political weights
￿is average US tari⁄ ￿ US welfare
organized all organized other
0.0000 61.2% 65.8% 53.8% 2.4%
0.2500 55.5% 63.8% 42.1% 2.4%
0.5000 52.5% 63.1% 35.6% 2.4%
0.7500 50.9% 63.5% 30.9% 2.3%
TABLE 4b: Sensitivity of world Nash tari⁄s w.r.t ￿is
Original Goldberg and Maggi (1999) political weights
￿is average tari⁄ ￿ average welfare
organized all organized other
0.0166 57.9% 63.4% 49.1% -3.5%
Proportionately scaled Goldberg and Maggi (1999) political weights
￿is average tari⁄ ￿ average welfare
organized all organized other
0.0000 58.2% 63.2% 50.2% -3.5%
0.2500 57.5% 65.6% 44.5% -3.5%
0.5000 58.2% 69.4% 40.3% -3.6%
0.7500 60.4% 74.1% 38.4% -3.8%
TABLE 4c: Sensitivity of world cooperative tari⁄s w.r.t ￿is
Original Goldberg and Maggi (1999) political weights
￿is average tari⁄ ￿ average welfare
organized all organized other
0.0166 -4.9% -6.3% -2.6% 3.4%
Proportionately scaled Goldberg and Maggi (1999) political weights
￿is average tari⁄ ￿ average welfare
organized all organized other
0.0000 -4.7% -6.0% -2.6% 3.4%
0.2500 -8.6% -12.1% -2.8% 3.0%
0.5000 -11.3% -16.5% -2.7% 2.6%
0.7500 -12.8% -19.0% -2.6% 2.2%
Notes: The entries are the political economy weight in organized industries (column 1), the average US optimal
tari⁄, average world Nash tari⁄, or average world cooperative tari⁄across all industries (column 2), the average
US optimal tari⁄, world Nash tari⁄, or world cooperative tari⁄ across organized industries (column 3), the
average US optimal tari⁄, world Nash tari⁄, or world cooperative tari⁄across non-organized industries (column
4), and the percentage change in US real income resulting from US optimal tari⁄s, the average percentage
change in world real income resulting from world Nash tari⁄s, or the average percentage change in world real
income resulting from world cooperative tari⁄s (column 5). All changes are computed relative to factual tari⁄s
in Table 4a and Table 4b but relative to Nash tari⁄s in Table 4c.










































Figure 1a: US optimal tari⁄s by industry










































Figure 1b: Mean Nash tari⁄s by industry
















































Figure 1c: Mean cooperative tari⁄s by industry






Response of US imports to US optimal tariffs relative to factual tariffs









































Figure 2a: Response of US imports to US optimal tari⁄s by industry








Response of US imports to world Nash tariffs relative to factual tariffs









































Figure 2b: Response of US imports to world Nash tari⁄s by industry








Response of US imports to world cooperative tariffs relative to Nash tariffs









































Figure 2c: Response of US imports to world cooperative tari⁄s by industry








Response of US production to US optimal tariffs relative to factual tariffs
















































Figure 3a: Response of US production to US optimal tari⁄s by industry








Response of US production to world Nash tariffs relative to factual tariffs
















































Figure 3b: Response of US production to world Nash tari⁄s by industry









Response of US production to world cooperative tariffs relative to Nash tariffs
















































Figure 3c: Response of US production to world cooperative tari⁄s by industry
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